With the entry into force of the Act Strengthening the Criminal Law Approach to Undermining Crime II on 10 November 2025 a new provision will be added to the Dutch Anti Money Laundering and Anti Terrorist Financing Act Wwft as of 1 July 2026 namely Article 17a Wwft. This article creates a specific power for FIU Netherlands to request that a financial institution temporarily hold a transaction for a maximum of five working days with a possible extension of a further five working days.
This arrangement fills a gap between the criminal seizure regime and the reporting obligation under the Wwft as in certain situations there may be indications of wrongdoing but as yet no statutory basis for intervention.
Fast and cross border payment processes make timely intervention more difficult which can necessitate early blocking through an FIU request. In situations where a foreign FIU issues a signal to FIU Netherlands there is often no criminal law basis to immediately seize assets. Article 17a therefore creates a limited non criminal law intervention mechanism.
Whether the holding of transactions will in practice contribute to disrupting criminal money flows has not yet been established. Its effectiveness will largely depend on whether institutions are able to adapt their systems and processes quickly enough.
When introduced Article 17a Wwft was aimed exclusively at banks. FIU Netherlands power to have transactions temporarily held therefore initially applied only to institutions executing payment transactions. However following the adoption by the House of Representatives of an amendment on 4 September 2025 the scope was expanded since other Wwft institutions may also be involved in transactions that potentially relate to money laundering or terrorist financing.
As a result Article 17a applies not only to banks but also to other financial institutions including investment funds crypto asset service providers and investment firms as well as estate agents civil law notaries tax advisers and lawyers.
Article 17a paragraph 5 Wwft explicitly provides that a financial institution must have policies procedures and measures in place that enable it to comply with an FIU request without delay. Without delay has the same meaning as in the context of FIU reporting namely without undue delay.
This means that institutions must organise their existing systems and processes in such a way that transactions can in fact be temporarily held. This includes for example the design of internal communication flows transaction systems ongoing monitoring and client communications. In practice implementation will prove challenging for many institutions as current processes and systems are often not designed to allow transactions to be held immediately.
It is advisable to initiate an investigation following an FIU request to determine whether any potentially unusual transactions took place prior to the request and whether further action is required.
The rules governing an FIU request to an institution should not be confused with the rules relating to the reporting of a suspicious transaction to the FIU by a financial institution.
In the case of an FIU report there is as yet no suspicion in the criminal law sense and no statutory basis for holding a transaction. In that situation the tipping off prohibition of Article 23 Wwft applies and the client may not be informed of the report. In the case of an FIU request under Article 17a Wwft the situation is different as the law expressly provides for an obligation to inform the client.
Article 17a Wwft therefore constitutes an explicit exception to the tipping off regime. Whereas previously any form of FIU interaction had to remain confidential in the event of a request to hold a transaction the client must be informed without delay. This exception also makes it easier for institutions to explain why a transaction is not being executed.
Within the European anti money laundering framework the role of the FIU has traditionally been limited to that of an intelligence body. Both the FATF standards and European anti money laundering legislation describe the FIU as a central point for receiving analysing and disseminating information. Intervention in transactions such as blocking or freezing is in principle reserved for criminal law.
Under the Fourth Anti Money Laundering Directive it was still explicitly recognised that FIUs could be involved in the suspension of transactions in urgent situations. This explicit recognition is absent from the current framework. The Sixth Anti Money Laundering Directive repositions the FIU as an intelligence unit without harmonised intervention powers while the Anti Money Laundering Regulation focuses on reporting obligations and compliance by institutions. Article 17a Wwft is therefore not a European obligation but a national policy choice within the scope permitted by European Union law.
