With the entry into force of the Act to Strengthen the Criminal Law Approach to Undermining Crime II on 10 November 2025, Article 17a Wwft was introduced. This article creates a specific power for FIU-Netherlands to request a financial institution to temporarily suspend a transaction for a maximum of five working days, with the option of an extension for a further five working days. The measure fills a gap between the criminal procedural seizure regime and the reporting obligation under the Wwft, as in certain situations there may be signals but no legal basis for intervention.
Fast and cross-border payment processes make timely intervention more difficult, which means early blocking through an FIU request may be necessary. When a foreign FIU sends a signal to FIU-Netherlands, a criminal procedural basis to impose immediate seizure is often lacking. Article 17a therefore creates a limited, non-criminal intervention mechanism.
Whether the suspension of transactions actually contributes to disrupting criminal financial flows has not yet been established. Its effectiveness largely depends on whether institutions can adapt their systems and processes quickly enough.
All Wwft institutions
Article 17a Wwft was initially aimed solely at banks. The power of FIU-Netherlands to have transactions temporarily suspended therefore applied only to institutions executing payment services. With the amendment adopted by the House of Representatives on 4 September 2025, the scope has been broadened. Other Wwft institutions may also be involved in transactions potentially linked to money laundering or terrorist financing. Article 17a therefore applies not only to banks but also to other financial institutions, including investment funds, crypto service providers and investment firms, as well as estate agents, notaries, tax advisers and lawyers.
Updating procedures and systems
Article 17a paragraph 5 Wwft states that a financial institution must have policies, procedures and measures in place that enable it to comply with an FIU request without delay, similar to the immediacy required for FIU reporting.
This means that institutions must configure their existing systems and processes to ensure that transactions can indeed be temporarily suspended. This includes setting up internal communication flows, transaction systems, ongoing monitoring and client communication. In practice, implementation will pose challenges for many institutions, as their current systems are not designed to suspend transactions immediately.
It is advisable to conduct an investigation following an FIU request to determine whether any unusual transactions took place prior to the request and whether further action is necessary.
Informing the client
The rules concerning an FIU request to an institution should not be confused with the rules related to an institution reporting a suspicious transaction to the FIU.
Two important distinctions must be made. When an FIU report is submitted by an institution, there is not yet a suspicion and therefore no legal basis exists to suspend a transaction. When an FIU request to suspend a transaction is issued, such a basis does exist. In addition, the tipping-off ban applies when an institution reports to the FIU, whereas an FIU request to suspend a transaction must be communicated to the client immediately.
Article 17a contains an information requirement that in practice conflicts with the logic of the tipping-off prohibition in Article 23 Wwft. Under the tipping-off prohibition, institutions must not inform clients of the fact that a transaction has been reported to the FIU. In the case of an FIU request to suspend a transaction, however, the client must be notified immediately. Where previously any interaction with the FIU had to be kept confidential, Article 17a Wwft creates an exception. At the same time, this exception enables institutions to explain more clearly to clients why certain transactions cannot be executed.
Relationship with the new European anti-money-laundering legislation (AMLR)
The AMLR will harmonise the regime concerning the blocking of transactions following an FIU report, which is new for Dutch practice. However, it does not contain a provision equivalent to the Dutch power created under Article 17a Wwft. It is therefore uncertain to what extent Article 17a Wwft can continue to exist under the future harmonised EU framework.
